Regular Bail
What is
Regular Bail?
Regular bail is granted under
Sections 437 and 439 of the CrPC to a person who has been arrested and is in
police or judicial custody. It allows the accused to be released from detention
during the pendency of the trial, on furnishing a bail bond and complying with
any conditions the court may impose. Regular bail can be granted by a
Magistrate (under Section 437) or by a Sessions or High Court (under Section
439), depending on the seriousness of the offence.
The court evaluates factors
like the nature of the offence, the accused’s criminal antecedents, possibility
of absconding, or tampering with witnesses or evidence before granting bail.
The guiding principle is that liberty must not be curtailed unless necessary,
and that pre-trial detention should not amount to punishment.
Landmark Cases in Matters of Regular Bail
1. Gudikanta Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh
Bench: (J) V.R. Krishna Iyer
Judgement: In a landmark judgment, Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for the Supreme Court, delivered a detailed exposition on the principles governing the grant of bail. He emphasized that the decision to grant or deny bail is not a matter of unfettered judicial discretion but must be firmly rooted in well-established legal standards. The Court reaffirmed the fundamental importance of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, stating that any deprivation of liberty—such as through the denial of bail—must be substantiated by compelling and constitutionally sound reasons.
The judgment outlined key considerations that should guide bail decisions, including the nature and seriousness of the offense, the strength of the evidence, the severity of the likely punishment, and the accused’s likelihood of appearing at trial. Justice Iyer cautioned against the arbitrary use of judicial power and advocated for a measured, balanced approach—one that protects individual rights while also ensuring the interests of justice and public safety are preserved.
In the case at hand, the Court noted that the petitioners had previously been acquitted at trial and had not misused bail when it was earlier granted. Recognizing the potential irreparable harm of continued detention during the pendency of appeals, the Court directed that bail be granted. This order came with specific conditions to ensure the petitioners' presence in future proceedings and to uphold public order.
2. 2. State
of Rajasthan v. Balchand alias Baliay
Bench: (J) V.R. Krishna Iyer, (J) N.L. Untwalia
Judgement: The general rule is to grant bail rather than impose jail, unless there are circumstances indicating a risk that the petitioner may flee from justice, obstruct the judicial process, commit further offences, intimidate witnesses, or otherwise misuse the liberty granted. When deciding on bail, courts must also consider the gravity and heinousness of the alleged offence, especially if these factors suggest a likelihood of evading justice.
In the present case, neither the
surrounding circumstances nor the petitioner’s social background justify
denying bail. Bail may be granted at this stage upon furnishing a monetary
surety. Any potential risk of absconding or misuse of bail can be addressed by
requiring the petitioner to report to the local police station once every two
weeks.
The petitioner had been on bail throughout the trial and was only taken into custody following the High Court's judgment. There is no evidence to suggest that he violated the court’s trust during that period. He does not appear to be a desperate or anti-social individual likely to abuse the court’s confidence or evade justice.
3. Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012)
Bench: (J) H.L Dattu, (J) G.S. Singhvi
Judgement: In Sanjay Chandra—a case arising from serious allegations of criminal conspiracy and corruption in the allocation of 2G telecom spectrum—the Supreme Court reaffirmed the foundational principle of “bail, not jail.” Even though the accused were charged with large‐scale economic offences carrying potentially severe impact on the country's economy, the Court noted that the investigation had already been completed and a charge-sheet submitted. It emphasized that once the investigative stage is over, custody is not necessary for further inquiry and pre-trial detention should not be used as a punitive tool.
The Court held that freedom is the
norm under Article 21 of the Constitution, and remand should remain an
exception unless there is concrete evidence of risk such as evasion,
interference with witnesses, or obstruction of justice. While acknowledging the
gravity of the offences, the judgment underscored that seriousness alone cannot
justify detention when procedural milestones—like the filing of a
charge-sheet—have been achieved. Consequently, the Court granted bail but
imposed stringent conditions to address any apprehensions of misuse, thereby
aligning with the presumption of innocence and the safeguarding of personal
liberty in non-bailable offences
4. Babu Singh & Ors. V. State of Uttar Pradesh
Bench: (J) V.R. Krishna Iyer
Judgement: In Babu Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1978), the Supreme Court held that a second bail application is maintainable if there is a change in circumstances, particularly when the accused has undergone prolonged detention due to trial delays. The Court emphasized that the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right to a speedy trial, and detention without timely trial is a violation of this right. It was held that bail should not be denied mechanically or as a punishment but granted liberally, especially where the accused is not likely to flee or tamper with evidence. The judgment underscored the principle that “bail is the rule, jail is the exception,” and criticized the judiciary for delays that infringe upon fundamental rights, thereby reinforcing the humanitarian approach in criminal justice.
5. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979)
Bench: (J) P.N. Bhagwati, (J) D.A. Desai
Judgement: In this judgement, Due to the non-appearance of the respondent despite being served notice, the Court accepted the allegations made in the writ petition and the published article as true. The Court strongly emphasized that the Indian Constitution firmly opposes discrimination in the exercise of fundamental rights and criticized the judiciary for its failure to address such inequality.
The Court held that the denial of bail to individuals named in Advocate Pushpa Kapila Hingorani’s writ petition violated their right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. Consequently, it ordered the immediate release of the named men, women, and children on bail, subject to personal sureties.
Further, the Court directed the state government and the High Court to compile and submit a list of all pending cases by December 31, 1978, along with the reasons for the delay. It also mandated the provision of free legal aid to all under-trial prisoners facing bailable charges.
Justice Bhagwati criticized the justice system for discriminating between the rich and poor and failing to protect the fundamental rights of prisoners—even after the landmark Maneka Gandhi case. While addressing bail provisions, he laid out specific criteria that courts must consider when deciding whether to grant bail:
·
Duration of the accused's residence in the
community;
·
Employment status, history, and financial
stability;
·
Family ties and personal relationships;
·
Reputation, character, and financial condition;
·
Past criminal record;
·
Whether a responsible person can vouch for the
accused’s appearance in court;
·
Nature of the offence, likelihood of conviction,
and
· Risk of absconding.
If the Court is satisfied on these grounds, the accused may be released on a personal bond. The bond amount must be set based on relevant individual circumstances rather than a mechanical assessment based on the offence. However, if the accused fails to appear in court as required, the bond shall be forfeited, which may result in bail being denied in the future.
In line with these principles, the Court ordered the release on bond of all under-trial prisoners named in the published article.
5. Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India
Bench: (J) Rohington Fali Nariman and (J) Sanjay Kishan Kaul
Judgement: In Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India (2017), the Supreme Court struck down Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), ruling that it violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, which guarantee the rights to equality and personal liberty. The Court directed that all bail petitions under the PMLA be reconsidered by the respective courts on their individual merits, without imposing the additional conditions specified in this provision.
The Court underscored the fundamental principle of the presumption of
innocence, criticizing the undue burden placed on accused persons to prove
their innocence at the bail stage. It condemned the classification based on the
length of imprisonment for scheduled offenses, finding that it led to arbitrary
and unfair decisions, effectively negating the presumption of innocence. While
acknowledging that personal liberties may be lawfully restricted in the
interest of the state, the Court held that such restrictions must be backed by
a legitimate state objective, which was lacking in this instance.
Following this judgment, the Court ordered the reassessment of all pending bail applications under the PMLA, excluding the unconstitutional conditions of Section 45(1). This ruling was widely seen as a strong affirmation of individual rights and reinforced the principle that bail should be granted as a right rather than an exception.
However, in 2018, Parliament amended Section 45 to reinstate similar bail restrictions, reigniting debates over the constitutionality of such provisions and their potential to infringe on individual freedoms. Critics argued that this amendment undermined the Supreme Court’s judgment and risked enabling misuse of power by enforcement agencies.
The Nikesh Tarachand Shah case remains a landmark decision in the ongoing discourse on judicial oversight versus legislative authority in India. It highlights the delicate balance between the state’s duty to combat serious crimes like money laundering and the imperative to safeguard fundamental constitutional rights, illustrating the persistent tension between personal liberty and legislative control in economic offense cases. Although this judgement was partially overruled by 2022 SC Judgement in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary Case.
6. Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav
Bench: (J) N. Santosh Hegde, (J) S.B. Sinha
Judgement: In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of successive bail applications and the conditions under which bail previously granted can be revoked. The appellant, Kalyan Chandra Sarkar, challenged the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent, Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, who was accused of conspiring to murder his brother, an MLA from Purnea Constituency.
The Supreme Court emphasized that while an accused has the right to make successive applications for bail, the court must consider the reasons and grounds on which earlier bail applications were rejected. The Court held that the High Court had failed to record any fresh grounds or consider the basis on which earlier bail applications were rejected, thereby vitiating the order granting bail.
The Court also noted that the respondent had misused the authority of a production warrant issued by the Madhepura Fast Track Court and had been granted unauthorized facilities in Patna Medical College Hospital, indicating his influence over the administration. These actions led the Court to cancel the bail granted by the High Court.
The Supreme Court reiterated that bail should not be granted solely on the ground of prolonged incarceration or the anticipated delay in trial proceedings. The Court emphasized that the seriousness of the offense and the conduct of the accused must be considered when granting or canceling bail.
7. Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana
Bench: (J) D.Y. Chandrachud, M.R. Shah
Judgement: In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, the Supreme Court strongly emphasized that granting bail must be done with judicial discipline and on well-established principles, especially in serious offences.
The Court observed that the Gujarat High Court had granted bail to the accused without giving due consideration to the gravity of the offence, the past criminal record of the accused, and the possible threat to witnesses. The accused had been charged with murder and other serious offences, and their release posed a risk to the safety of witnesses and the fairness of the trial.
The Supreme Court held that liberty of an accused must be balanced with the rights of the victim and societal interests, especially in violent crimes. The judgment stressed that bail orders must not be casual, arbitrary, or mechanical, and must reflect a proper application of mind.
Consequently,
the apex court cancelled the bail granted by the High Court and laid down that
the interest of justice and public safety must guide decisions on bail in
heinous offences.
Anticipatory Bail
What is
Anticipatory Bail?
Anticipatory bail is a
pre-arrest legal safeguard provided under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) (Now Section 482 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita). It is
granted to a person who has reason to believe that they might be arrested for a
non-bailable offence, and wishes to avoid arrest by securing a direction from
the court for bail in advance.
This form of bail is
preventive in nature and is usually granted by the Sessions Court or the High
Court. The court may impose various conditions such as cooperation with the
investigation, not leaving the country without permission, or not tampering
with evidence. The primary objective is to protect personal liberty and prevent
abuse of the legal process, especially in cases of false or motivated
complaints.
Landmark Cases in Matters of Anticipatory Bail
1. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia & Ors. V. State of Punjab
Bench: (J) YV Chandrachud, (J) PN Bhagwati, (J) NL Untwalia, (J) RS Pathak, and (J) O. Chinnappa Reddy.
Judgement: The Supreme Court held that an individual seeking anticipatory bail must have a legitimate and reasonable basis for their application, rather than merely a vague fear or suspicion of arrest. The five-judge bench emphasized that the applicant must demonstrate a "reason to believe" that they may be arrested for a non-bailable offense. This belief must be grounded in reasonable and objective grounds. Mere fear or apprehension, without concrete reasons, is insufficient. The Court stated that the grounds for such belief must be subject to judicial scrutiny, enabling the court to determine the validity of the applicant’s claim. Therefore, Section 438(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be invoked on vague or general allegations as a means of indefinite protection against potential arrest.
Furthermore, the Court clarified that when an application for anticipatory bail is filed before the High Court or the Court of Session, that court must independently evaluate whether the facts warrant granting such relief. It cannot defer this decision to the Magistrate under Section 437 CrPC. The Supreme Court also ruled that anticipatory bail may be granted even after the filing of an FIR, provided the applicant has not yet been arrested. However, once the accused has been arrested, Section 438 cannot be invoked. In such cases, the accused must seek bail under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, as anticipatory bail applies only before arrest.
The Court further explained the distinction between ordinary bail and anticipatory bail. Ordinary bail is granted after arrest and leads to release from custody, whereas anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest, becoming effective immediately upon arrest. Police custody generally follows arrest for non-bailable offenses, and anticipatory bail serves as a form of protection against such custody. It is a pre-arrest legal safeguard that ensures the accused, if arrested on specified accusations, will be released on bail without detention.
In summary, the Supreme Court’s judgment provides a clear and authoritative framework on anticipatory bail, reinforcing that it must be sought on reasonable grounds and that courts must independently assess such applications. This ruling has since guided numerous subsequent decisions on the grant of bail.
2. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra
Bench: (J) Dalveer Bhandari, (J) K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan
Judgement: The Supreme Court of India, in Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, reaffirmed that the concept of bail is fundamentally rooted in the protection of individual liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court stressed that bail should not be denied arbitrarily, and pre-conviction incarceration must be approached with caution. Emphasizing the principle that “bail is the rule, and jail is the exception,” the Court held that denial of bail is justified only in exceptional cases where there is a tangible risk of misuse.
In this case, the Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s decision to deny bail, finding that the reasons provided were insufficient and did not meet the legal standards necessary to refuse bail. The Court laid down key legal principles, reaffirming that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and this presumption must guide bail decisions.
Furthermore, granting bail should be the norm, while denial should be rare and only applied where there is concrete evidence of the accused fleeing justice or tampering with evidence or witnesses. Ultimately, the Court emphasized the need for courts to balance societal interests with the protection of individual rights when adjudicating bail applications.
3. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi)
Bench: (J) Arun Mishra, (J) Indira Banerjee, (J) Vineet Saran, (J) MR Shah and (J) S. Ravindra Bhat
Judgement: On January 29, 2020, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Sushila Aggarwal and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) unanimously held that anticipatory bail is not subject to any fixed time limit and can remain effective until the conclusion of the trial. The Court resolved the long-standing controversy by clarifying that anticipatory bail does not have a statutory time restriction unless explicitly imposed by the court granting it.
The decision emphasized that courts should consider the facts of each case carefully and must have reasonable grounds to believe there is a genuine apprehension of arrest before granting anticipatory bail. The court may also impose appropriate conditions as deemed necessary.
The judgment further clarified that there is no statutory limitation on the duration of anticipatory bail, leaving it entirely to the discretion of the court issuing the order. Conditions or limitations not specified in the statute can be imposed by the court based on the circumstances of the case. This ruling expressly overruled earlier judgments, including those in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh, Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre, K.L. Verma, Sunita Devi, Adri Dharan Das, Nirmal Jeet Kaur, HDFC Bank Limited, Satpal Singh, Naresh Kumar Yadav, and related cases.
The Supreme Court also laid down important guidelines for courts handling anticipatory bail applications under Section 438 of the CrPC:
1. Applications should be based on concrete facts relating to the offence and the applicant’s reasonable apprehension of arrest, rather than vague or general allegations.
2. Anticipatory bail applications may be filed even before the FIR is registered, as soon as there are substantial grounds for apprehension of arrest.
3. Depending on the seriousness of the arrest threat, courts should issue notice to the Public Prosecutor and consider facts carefully, even when granting limited interim anticipatory bail.
4. Section 438 does not mandate courts to impose time limits or conditions linked to filing of the FIR or recording of witness statements. Courts must evaluate the seriousness and gravity of the offence to decide on any conditions.
5. Anticipatory bail can continue after the charge sheet has been filed and remain valid until the trial ends.
6. An anticipatory bail order cannot cover future offences and should not be a blanket protection against any possible arrest.
7. Granting anticipatory bail does not restrict police or investigative agencies from performing their duties. Under Section 439(2), police may approach the court to seek cancellation of bail and arrest the accused in certain circumstances.
8. The validity of an anticipatory bail order can be reviewed by a higher court on the request of the investigating agency or state, and may be set aside if material facts or circumstances were not considered. Such setting aside is not a cancellation but a judicial reconsideration.
By ruling that Section 438 cannot be time-bound, the Supreme Court conclusively put to rest the long-standing debate on the duration of anticipatory bail, providing clear guidance to courts and litigants alike.
4. Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat
Bench: (J) A.K. Sikri
Judgement: The Supreme Court observed that forcing the Appellant to undergo incarceration as an undertrial would serve no purpose, especially considering the incident in question was 17 years old and the charge was framed only in 2014. The investigation had already been completed, and there was no indication that the Appellant posed a flight risk. Although the FIR was registered and trial initiated in 2001—initially under Section 506(2) IPC—the Appellant had consistently participated in the proceedings.
There were no claims that he attempted to influence witnesses during this period. Given these circumstances, the Court held that the seriousness of the charge alone was not sufficient grounds to deny anticipatory bail, especially when other relevant factors pointed in the Appellant’s favor. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned High Court order and reinstated the anticipatory bail granted by the Additional Sessions Judge on 18.05.2013, subject to the original conditions.
5. HDFC Bank Ltd. V. J.J. Mannan (2010)
Bench: (J) Altamas Kabir, (J) Deepak Verma
Judgement: HDFC Bank sanctioned a loan of ₹2,03,40,000 to J.J. Mannan for the purchase of six electronic sensor paver finishers. However, the machinery was never procured, and the loan amount was allegedly diverted through fraudulent transactions involving fake accounts and shell companies. Upon discovering the fraud, the Bank lodged a criminal complaint, after which the Madras High Court granted anticipatory bail to Mannan. Challenging this, HDFC Bank approached the Supreme Court, arguing that Mannan had masterminded a serious financial fraud and should not be allowed to avoid prosecution through a blanket bail order.
The Supreme Court, after examining the matter, modified the High Court’s decision. It emphasized that anticipatory bail is not meant to offer indefinite protection from legal proceedings. The Court ordered Mannan to surrender and apply for regular bail, reinforcing that anticipatory bail must be time-limited and cannot be used to escape accountability.
6. K.L. Verma v. State (1996)
Bench: (J) A.M. Ahmadi, (J) J.S. Verma
Judgement: The Judgement under this case, stated that anticipatory bail does not end as soon as the accused is produced before regular court but he may continue to enjoy the protection until the regular bail application is decided.
7. Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal
Bench: (J) Arijit Pasayat, (J) S.H. Kapadia
Judgement: In this case, the Supreme Court considered the scope of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The appellant, Adri Dharan Das, approached the Court seeking anticipatory bail after it was rejected by the Calcutta High Court. The Court emphasized that the provision of anticipatory bail is not a means to obstruct lawful arrest during investigation. It clarified that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy, granted only when there is a reasonable belief of likely arrest on false or motivated grounds. A mere apprehension without credible basis is not sufficient to invoke Section 438. The Court also held that courts cannot pass blanket orders restraining arrest by the police in anticipation of an FIR or investigation.
The power under Section 438 is discretionary and must be exercised with caution, especially in cases involving serious offences like fraud and forgery, as was alleged against the appellant. Once a person is arrested, they must seek regular bail under Sections 437 or 439 CrPC, and Section 438 ceases to apply. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision to deny anticipatory bail, and reinforced the principle that anticipatory bail should not be granted as a matter of routine, especially in serious criminal cases where custodial interrogation may be necessary.
8. Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Bench: (J) Arijit Pasayat, (J) C.K. Thakker
Judgement: In this case, Nirmal Jeet Kaur applied for ad-interim anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, fearing arrest in proceedings initiated against her in Madhya Pradesh. The Supreme Court exercised its authority, granting her anticipatory bail subject to furnishing a personal bond of ₹20,000 with one surety of equal amount, enforceable in case of breach.
The Court emphasized that anticipatory bail is not an automatic entitlement but a discretionary remedy, intended to protect liberty when there is reasonable apprehension of arrest. It clarified that Section 438 enables conditional directives—such as bond requirements—not necessarily full bail before arrest.
Crucially, the Court observed that anticipatory bail protection does not terminate simply because a regular bail application is filed. Instead, it continues until a decision on regular bail is rendered. This interpretation aligns with earlier precedents allowing interim protection till the accused seeks and secures release under Sections 437/439.
The ruling reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s stance in cases like Salauddin, K.L. Verma, Sunita Devi, Adri Dharan Das, and itself (Nirmal Jeet Kaur) that anticipatory bail orders should ordinarily be of a limited duration, tied to progress in investigation and the filing of the charge sheet. Such a limitation ensures that the authority of regular courts and the integrity of the investigative process are preserved
Interim Bail
What is Interim
Bail?
Interim bail is a temporary
and time-bound relief granted to an accused while the court is considering a
regular or anticipatory bail application. Although not specifically mentioned
in the CrPC, courts derive the power to grant interim bail through their inherent
judicial discretion. It acts as a bridge between the filing and final disposal
of a bail application, ensuring that the person is not arrested or remains in
custody during that interim period.
Interim bail is often granted
for specific reasons like medical emergencies, family needs, or court delays,
and is typically subject to conditions. If the main bail application is
rejected, interim bail automatically lapses and the person must surrender.
Landmark Cases in Matters of Interim Bail
1. Lavesh v. State of NCT of Delhi
Bench: (J) P. Sathasivam
Judgement: In Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Supreme Court held that an accused who has been declared a proclaimed offender under Section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not entitled to seek anticipatory or interim bail. The Court emphasized that such individuals have already shown a clear intention to evade the legal process and cannot expect the protection of the court while simultaneously avoiding arrest.
The judgment highlighted that granting interim bail to a proclaimed offender would defeat the very purpose of declaring someone a fugitive under law. The Court underscored that interim bail is an extraordinary relief, not to be granted routinely, especially where the accused has failed to cooperate with the investigation or has willfully absconded.
As a result, the Supreme Court refused to grant any protection to the appellant and dismissed his appeal, reinforcing that respect for legal process and cooperation with investigation are essential prerequisites for seeking any form of bail.
2. Rambalak Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar
Bench: (J) P.B. Gajendragadkar, (J) J.C. Shah, (J) S.M. Sikri, (J) V. Ramaswami
Judgement: In the State of Bihar v. Rambalak Singh and Others, the Supreme Court examined whether a High Court, while hearing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an order of preventive detention under Rule 30 of the Defense of India Rules, could grant interim bail to the detenus.
The Court upheld the High Court's jurisdiction and held that while preventive detention laws are framed for specific objectives such as safeguarding national security or maintaining public order, this does not preclude the constitutional powers of the High Courts to ensure that the detention is lawful and not arbitrary.
The Supreme
Court clarified that the High Courts are vested with wide powers under Article
226, including the power to issue interim relief, such as bail, during the
pendency of a habeas corpus petition. However, the Court emphasized that this
power should be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases, especially
in preventive detention matters, where the grounds for detention must be
compelling and lawful.
In this case, since the High Court found prima facie merit in the detenus' claims and no urgent threat posed by their temporary release, the grant of interim bail was held valid.
Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State of Bihar, reaffirming that interim reliefs like bail can be granted by High Courts in habeas corpus petitions, even in matters of preventive detention, provided that it is done with caution and judicial discretion.
3. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati (2020)
Bench: (J) Ashok Bhushan v. (J) R. Subhash Reddy
Judgement: In this case, the State of Uttar Pradesh challenged the order of the Allahabad High Court granting interim bail to Gayatri Prasad Prajapati, a former Cabinet Minister of the State, who was facing serious criminal charges including under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. \
The High Court had granted him interim bail on 3 September 2020 for a period of two months, citing his deteriorating health condition and ongoing treatment. It noted that he had been admitted to various hospitals, including King George’s Medical University and later to Sanjay Gandhi Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences, for multiple medical complications.
The Supreme
Court examined the medical records and found that the respondent had indeed
been seriously ill since May 2019. The Court held that the High Court had
exercised its discretion judiciously and had not committed any error in
granting interim bail, particularly when the bail was conditional and
supervised.
The appeal filed by the State was accordingly dismissed, and the order of interim bail was upheld, recognizing that in cases of genuine medical emergency, interim bail can be a justified constitutional safeguard under Article 21 of the Constitution.
4. Rohit Tandon v. Directorate of Enforcement
Bench: (J) Ashutosh Kumar
Judgement: In Rohit Tandon vs Directorate of Enforcement, the Delhi High Court considered the petitioner’s application for interim bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The petitioner had already spent over seven months in custody, and a chargesheet had been filed. His counsel, withdrew the main application for regular bail, which had recently been rejected, and instead sought interim bail on compassionate grounds due to the critical medical condition of the petitioner’s mother, who had suffered a cervical spine fracture.
The Court, while noting that there was no conclusive evidence of the petitioner attempting to tamper with evidence or influence witnesses, found merit in granting interim bail for three weeks. This relief was granted primarily on humanitarian grounds, considering the petitioner’s family circumstances, including his responsibility as the sole male member of the household and the urgent need for him to tend to his mother.
However, the Court imposed strict conditions, notably that the petitioner shall not leave the country under any circumstances during the period of interim bail.
5. Mohammad Azam Khan v. State of U.P.
Bench: (J) A.S. Bopanna, (J) B.R. Gavai, (J) L. Nageswar Rao
Judgement: In Mohammad Azam Khan v. State of U.P. & Another, the Allahabad High Court addressed the maintainability of the petitioner’s anticipatory bail plea under Section 438 Cr.P.C. and held it to be non-maintainable, as Khan was already deemed to be in custody upon the issuance and communication of a B-warrant dated November 19, 2020.
However, in subsequent proceedings, the Supreme Court took note of his prolonged incarceration, the delay in filing chargesheets, and the surrounding political context to grant him interim bail in connection with FIR No. 70/2020, which pertained to alleged forgery of documents for land allotment.
The Court observed that continued
custody, despite the circumstances, was unjustified and accordingly allowed
interim relief under Article 142 of the Constitution. It directed Khan to apply
for regular bail before the trial court and stated that the interim bail would
continue if the regular bail was not granted immediately.
Thus, while anticipatory bail was denied due to deemed custody, the petitioner was ultimately granted interim bail on humanitarian and equitable considerations.
6. Bhairaram Saraswat v. State of Maharashtra & Ors
Bench: (J) Revati Mohite Dere, (J) Manjusha Deshpande
Judgement: In this case, the petitioner, Bhairaram Saraswat, approached the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), challenging the legality of his arrest by the Mumbai Police. He alleged that he was illegally picked up from Ahmedabad by plainclothes police officers without any prior notice under Section 41A CrPC, without being shown an arrest memo, and without being produced before a local magistrate for transit remand in Gujarat, thereby violating Section 57 CrPC. The petitioner further contended that he was denied access to legal counsel and that his family was not informed about his detention in due time, which was a serious breach of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in DK Basu v. State of West Bengal.
The petitioner submitted CCTV footage and other evidence to show that he was forcibly detained on 1 April 2024 without following due process. On 5 April 2024, after hearing the parties, the Division Bench granted interim bail to the petitioner on a cash bond of ₹25,000 with one surety, observing that the procedural violations appeared prima facie evident and warranted temporary protection of the petitioner’s liberty. The Court had directed the State to place on record the call detail records (CDRs), CCTV footage, and WhatsApp communication that formed the basis of the alleged arrest. During further proceedings, the police admitted to lapses, including non-issuance of notice under Section 41A and failure to comply with procedural safeguards regarding arrest and transit.
In view of the seriousness of the violation of procedural rights and in light of the police admitting to deviation from mandated procedures, the State informed the Court that departmental action had been initiated against the concerned investigating officer and that he had been placed under suspension. The Bench recorded this compliance with concern but also acknowledged the promptness of corrective measures taken by the State. Considering all facts, the Court held that the arrest was indeed in violation of constitutional and statutory protections afforded to the accused, especially in the context of arresting a person from outside the jurisdiction of the investigating agency.
Therefore, by order dated 11 July 2024, the Bombay High Court confirmed the interim bail granted earlier, continuing it on the same terms and conditions. The writ petition was disposed of with a stern reminder to the law enforcement authorities that any violation of arrest and remand procedures not only undermines the rule of law but also directly affects personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court reiterated the obligation of the police to strictly comply with Sections 41, 41A, and 57 CrPC and ensure that the guidelines laid down in DK Basu and Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar are adhered to without exception. It cautioned that any future breach would attract serious judicial scrutiny and appropriate orders, including compensation and contempt.
7. Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi
Bench: (J) Pankaj Mithal, (J) Ahsanuddin Amanulla
Judgement: In Mohd. Tahir Hussain v. State of NCT of Delhi, the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict on the petitioner’s plea for interim bail to enable him to campaign in the Delhi Legislative Assembly elections. The petitioner, a former municipal councilor, had been in custody for nearly five years in connection with multiple FIRs related to the 2020 Delhi riots, including serious charges under Sections 302, 120B, and other provisions of the IPC and Arms Act.
Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, taking note of the prolonged pre-trial detention, incomplete trial proceedings, and the fundamental importance of electoral participation in a democracy, granted interim bail until 4 February 2025, subject to stringent conditions such as restricted movement, daily police reporting, prohibition on speaking about the case, and no attempt to influence witnesses.
In contrast, Justice Pankaj Mithal denied the plea, holding that the right to contest or campaign in elections was neither a fundamental nor statutory right, and given the serious allegations against the petitioner—such as involvement in a conspiracy leading to the death of an IB officer—the risk of misuse or influence outweighed any temporary liberty. He cautioned that allowing such bail could set a dangerous precedent for undertrials.
Due to this divergence, the matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders by a larger bench. The case highlighted the judicial dilemma between upholding electoral rights and maintaining the integrity of criminal proceedings in riot-related offences.
8. Barun Chandra Thakur v. Central Bureau of Investigation
Bench: (J) R.K. Aggarwal
Judgement: In Barun Chandra Thakur v. Central Bureau of Investigation, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether the interim bail granted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to the trustees and management officials of Ryan International School—namely Ryan Pinto, Augustine Pinto, and Grace Pinto—should be interfered with.
The case arose from the tragic murder of a seven-year-old student, Pradyuman Thakur, within the school premises, which initially led to wide public outrage and allegations of gross negligence and possible conspiracy involving the school authorities. While the petitioner, father of the deceased child, sought cancellation of the interim protection, the Supreme Court held that there was no ground to interfere with the High Court’s reasoned order.
The Court noted that the High Court had correctly observed that there was no direct material implicating the applicants at that stage, and that the investigation was still at a preliminary phase, now being conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation.
The Supreme
Court emphasized that interim bail under Section 438 CrPC had been granted
after considering all relevant factors, including the applicants' cooperation
with the investigation and the absence of any criminal antecedents. It was
further held that no mala fides could be attributed to the respondents in
seeking anticipatory bail, and that the High Court had exercised its discretion
judiciously.
Therefore, the
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the interim bail granted by the
High Court to continue, reinforcing the principle that liberty should not be
curtailed unless supported by clear and credible evidence.
