On Tuesday, the Supreme Court acquitted an individual who had been convicted by the High Court of Madras under Section 304 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) of the IPC. The Court stated that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges against him beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore he deserved to be acquitted in the interest of justice.
The bench comprising Justice BR Gavai, Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Aravind Kumar stated that it is possible to convict an accused based on credible evidence. However, in certain cases, where the evidence is inseparable and removing any part would undermine the foundation of the prosecution's version, the court can reject the evidence entirely within its legal limits.
Based on the facts presented in the case, there was an argument between the Victim and the appellant in demanding wages. The alleged(appellant) then brought a stick made out of rubber form behind the tea stall and attacked the victim who died due to the injuries he acquired. The High court, after careful consideration, determined that the Appellant lacked the necessary mens rea for murder, as the act was not premeditated but rather a spontaneous reaction to the immediate circumstances.
Following the Sessions Court's conviction for murder and life sentence, the High Court, upon appeal, reclassified the offense to culpable homicide under Section 304-II of the IPC and reduced the sentence to five years' rigorous imprisonment. They acknowledged the causal connection between the Appellant's actions and the victim's death but concluded that the requisite mens rea for murder was absent.
Though upon a comprehensive review of the evidence presented, the Apex Court concluded that the preponderance of circumstances suggests the victim, potentially under the influence of alcohol, ascended a tree and subsequently fell, sustaining a fatal head injury.
Initially deemed non-severe and not requiring hospitalization or police notification, the victim's condition later deteriorated significantly, leading to suspicions of a contrived case against the Appellant. The Apex Court found the prosecution's presentation lacking in credibility.
Despite the presence of two major witnesses i.e., Ponnaian and Velukutti at the scene of the alleged incident, as documented by PW2 and PW3, and their recorded statements during the investigation, the prosecution did not present them. This omission raises concerns about the completeness and reliability of the prosecution's case.
The prosecution's failure to call or provide justification for the non-appearance of Ponnaian and Velukutti, despite their presence at the scene and recorded statements, constitutes a violation of Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act, allowing the court to draw adverse inferences against the prosecution's case, as concluded by the Apex Court.
Also while reviewing the evidence, the Court noticed a three-day gap between the alleged incident (March 12th) and the filing of the FIR (March 15th). Witness claims of fear and threats weren't deemed sufficient explanation, casting doubt on the prosecution's timeline.
The absence of relevant medical documents establishing a direct link between the rubber stick blow and the victim's head injury, as opposed to a potential fall, precluded the Court from definitively attributing the injury to the Appellant's actions. This lack of corroborating evidence weakens the prosecution's case and raises concerns about the sufficiency of proof.
Relying solely on the Appellant's three-year abscondence as evidence of guilt was deemed insufficient by the Court. They acknowledged that fleeing apprehension is natural for someone facing an FIR.
Mere absence, even prolonged, cannot be the sole basis for establishing guilt or a guilty conscience. Abscondence, while relevant in certain cases, derives its evidentiary value from the surrounding circumstances, which in this instance fail to support the prosecution's case.
At last after a thorough analysis of the delayed FIR filing and the threadbare nature of the remaining evidence, the Court concluded that the circumstances surrounding Palas' death lacked the clarity and unequivocally required to definitively implicate the Appellant. The possibility of his false implication could not be entirely disregarded, leading to the setting aside of his conviction.
