Article 356 can be constitutionally justified as a safeguard to maintain constitutional governance in states. However, in practice, it has often been misused for political purposes, undermining federal principles. Its use must be strictly limited, transparently reviewed, and subject to strong judicial scrutiny to align with the spirit of cooperative federalism.

Article 356 of the Indian Constitution was designed as a constitutional safeguard to address situations where a state government fails to function according to constitutional provisions, allowing the central government to impose President’s Rule to maintain governance and uphold the constitutional order. In modern federalism, this provision can be constitutionally justified as a necessary tool to protect the unity and integrity of the nation. However, in practice, Article 356 has often been misused for political gains, with the central government dismissing elected state governments led by opposition parties under questionable pretexts. Such misuse undermines the federal structure by eroding state autonomy and democratic principles. Therefore, while Article 356 has a valid constitutional purpose, its application requires strict judicial oversight and safeguards to prevent it from becoming an instrument of political exploitation.

Article 356 can be constitutionally justified in modern federalism as an emergency provision to protect the constitutional order if a state government fails to function according to the Constitution. However, its history shows frequent political misuse, undermining state autonomy and federal principles, leading commissions and the Supreme Court to stress that it should be invoked only as a last resort with stringent safeguards. Thus, while justified in rare, genuine breakdowns of constitutional machinery, Article 356 is often criticized as a tool for political advantage, and its use must be strictly limited to preserve true federalism.