The role of the Governor in the Indian federal structure has been a subject of intense debate and criticism. Constitutionally, the Governor is envisaged as the head of the State and a link between the Centre and the State, expected to function as an impartial constitutional authority under Articles 153 to 162. However, in practice, the office has often been viewed as acting more as a representative of the Central Government than as a neutral head of the State.

The appointment of Governors by the President (i.e., the Central Government) and the absence of fixed tenure makes them vulnerable to political influence. This has led to allegations of misuse, especially in cases involving government formation, dismissal of State governments, or recommending President’s Rule under Article 356, often based on partisan considerations. The Sarkaria Commission and later the Punchhi Commission recommended reforms to ensure neutrality, including consulting the State government before appointing a Governor and insulating the office from political bias.

Judicial pronouncements, such as in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), have placed checks on arbitrary use of the Governor’s powers, particularly regarding Article 356. Still, the perceived politicisation of the Governor’s role—especially in opposition-ruled States—continues to raise concerns about federal integrity.

In conclusion, while the Governor is constitutionally the head of the State, in reality, the office often operates as an agent of the Centre, thereby undermining the spirit of cooperative federalism. Ensuring transparency in appointments and clearer accountability mechanisms is essential to restore the credibility and federal balance of this constitutional office.